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THE PROMETHEAN SELF AND COMMUNITY 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES 
by John J. McDet-nlott 
Surely the ~ndtv~dnal ,  the percon In the s~ngular nurnbet, is the more fttndarnental 
phenomenon, and the coc~al Insrlrutlon of e h a t e ~ e r  grade, 15 but ~econdary and 
rnlrilstel ~ a l  
(Wlll~arn Jarne5, il.fet?~orrer and Stlidres, p 102) 
From the outset, we should make it clear that readers of the writings of 
William James are hard put to find a doctrine of community therein. In 
fact, the basic cast of his thought runs not only against social conglomerates 
but against simple aggregates as well. I n  a letter of June 7 ,  1899, he writes: 
As for me, my bed IS m a d e  I am against b~gness and greatness in all their forms, 
and w ~ t h  the invis~ble molecular moral forces that work from individual to In- 
d~vidual, stealing tn through the crannies of the world l ~ k e  so many soft rootlets, or 
l ~ k e  the cap~llary oozing of water, and yet rending the hardest monuments of man's 
prtde, tf you glve them tlme The bigger the unlt you deal wtth, the hollower, the 
more brutal, the more mendac~ous is the life d~splayed So I am against all big 
organ~zations as F U C ~ ,  nat~onal  ones f~rs t  and foremost; agatnst all b ~ g  successes and 
b ~ g  results; and in favor of the eternal forces of truth which always work in the 
t n d t v ~ d ~ ~ a l  and tmmed~ately unsuccessful way, under-dogs always, t t l l  h~story comes, 
after they are long dead, and puts them on the top. '  
James was an unabashed arid indefatigable champion o f  sheer individuality. 
Many have interpreted him as the paragon of  a philosophical version of the 
mythic American claim to rugged individualism, despite his own 
proclivities' being due more to the genteel brahmin experience than to that 
o f  the more fabled frontier sort. Nonetheless, James's version of the in- 
dividual has much to teach uc about a doctrine of community, especially as 
it is worked out in the fabric of American life. 
--- 
John J .  McDermott i c  Professor of Philo<ophy at Tcwi  A&M Un~tersity. 
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It is unquestionable that a central theme in all of James's life and 
thought has to d o  with the nature of self-consciousness and the meaning of 
human activity. The remarkable upshot of this long-standing theme is that 
James collapses the first concern, self-consciousness, into the second, 
human activity, so that John Dewey can write of "the vanishing subject in 
the psychology of James." 
There is a double strain in the "prtnciples of psychology" by Wtlliam James. One strain 
is official acceptance of epistemological dualism. According to this view, the sc~ence of 
psychology centers about a subject which is "mental" just as physics centers about an 
object which is material. But James's analysis of special topics tends, on the contrary, 
to reduction of the subject to a vanishing point, save as "subject" is ~dentified with the 
organism, the latter, moreover, having no existence save in lnteractlon with environing 
conditions. According to the latter strain, subject and object do not stand for separate 
orders or klnds of existence but at most certain distinctions made for a def~nite purpore 
within exper~ence.' 
Dewey is fundamentally correct in the interpretation of the Principles. 
He,  like other subsequent commentators, was able to  spot James's early 
dubiety about the existence of  a substantial self, because of the later 
position taken in Essays in Radical Empir i~ i s in .~  It is made clear in those 
essays that James, while writing the Principles, had adopted a 
methodological dualism between self and world only because he  would not 
resolve the question of  consciousness at that time. It is not until some 
fifteen years later that James presents his mature position on these matters, 
especially in "Does Consciousness Exist?" (1904) and "The Experience of 
Activity" (1905). This line of intellectual development from the Principles 
to Essays in Radical Empiricism is now a commentator's truism and I d o  
not oppose it. Yet there is another strand in this development, and,  when 
noticed at all, it is not sufficiently integrated into James's radically em- 
pirical doctrine of human activity. I refer here to  the evocative language of 
his personal crisis and his ensuing attempt to pose the human will as 
cognitive. In short, I see James's self as one that is self-creating in its 
transactions with the environment. Although it is true that James's focus 
was distinctively and aggressively individual, it will not take much trans- 
formation to  show that his phenomenology of the Lebenswelt can be 
understood in a social matrix. John Dewey, for one, had n o  difficulty in 
overlooking just that transformation of James's position, without, 
however, so  acknowledging. 
Proceeding now, seriatim, I wish to consider the developmental stages 
in James's doctrine of the self: a )  his crisis texts, b)  material from the 
"Principles of  PsychoIogy," and c) his radical empiricism. I shall then 
attempt to illustrate the  social and communal significance of James's 
position, as if h e  had chosen t o  d o  so himself. 
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At this point in the James literature, his crisis texts are comparatively 
well-known, although aspects of them have not been adequately studied. 
We have three texts extant, of which two are diary entries of February I ,  
1870, and April 30, 1870. The third is more difficult to place 
chronologically, although the experience on which i t  was based most likely 
occurred sometime between the two diary entries mentioned above .The  
actual publication of this third text occurred in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience under the guise of a communication from an anonymous French 
correspondent. We now know this to be an autobiographical version of an 
experience undergone by James some thirty years earlier. 
It is difficult to know exactly the cause of James's period of depression 
from 1868 until 1870, although this has not stilled the frequent speculation 
as to a correct diagnosis of his malady, especially as he and his family have 
left so very many private papers and letters.' One of the most intriguing and 
plausible interpretations is that of William Clebsch, who attributes to James 
an advanced case of acedia. Considering James's situation from 1868 untiI 
1870, Clebsch writes: 
In an earlier era this plight would have been recognized as acedia, o r  torpor. 
Catholic moralists wrongly combined thrs eighth deadly sin of the early monks with 
sloth, mistaking the inability to act for laziness. Acedia was rather an overscrupulous 
wonder~ng about what one ought to do. It prevented one from doing anything. It 
tempted one to sulcide as the only escape from the ennui and the gu~l t  of inactivity. 
Victims of acedia could love nothing, could hate only themselves and could hate 
themselves only for their inability to love anythrng, Including themselves. 
In the h~story of Western spirrtuality acedia had been treated by placing its 
victlms under the absolute sp~ntua l  authority of another. Mar t~n  Luther's confessor 
dealt with ~ u c h  scrupulos~ty in the young monk by ordering h ~ m  to teach biblicat 
theology in Wittenberg. But James had no Doctor John Staupitz. The sole author~ty 
he could find was his own ability to believe that he might command his own will. 
Havrng e n v ~ ~ i o n e d  the only escapes from acedia as comrnitt~ng suic~de or having a 
shr~veled soul, James became his own splrltual director. Rectt~ng verses of comfort 
In the crlsis of fear had held James back from rnsanrty and suic~de, but God had not 
delivered him. He began saving h~mself from acedia, a feat traditionally held im- 
possrble. He became, as ~t were, at once the sick-souled patient and hrs own ab- 
solvrng confessor. Nor does it detract from the feat to point out that hrs ~ndulgent 
father could afford to let this thirty-one-year-old son teach or rest, work or travel, 
as best pleased hrm. The frscal ease that alloived for t h ~ s  cure must also have 
deepened the malady .6 
In his diary entry of February 1 ,  1870, James states his plight: 
Today I about touched bottom, and percelve plainly that I must face the choice with 
open eyes: shall I frankly throw the moral busines$ overbaard, as one uns~r~ted  to my 
innate aptitude, or shall I follow it, and ~t alone, m a k ~ n g  everyth~ng else merely stuff for 
it? I will give the latter alternative a fair trial. Who knows but the moral interest may 
become developed. . . . Hitherto I have trled to f ~ r e  myself wtth the moral interest, as 
an aid in the accornplish~ng of certain util~tarian ends.' 
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In my judgment, James here laments his second-handedness. Burdened 
by his father's overwhelming presence and his pressure on James to  adopt a 
career, he entertains the possibility of abandoning his inherited ethic for a 
hedonistic life. James's complaint about the "moral business" is that i r  
functioned only jn a utilitarian way and was not deeply rooted as a personal 
commitment. His inability to cut between these options of hedonism and 
second-handedness made him ripe for an intense personal experience un- 
detgone sometime in the early spring of 1870. As James tells i t :  
Whilst In thls state of philosoph~c pessim~em and general depression of sprite about my 
prospects, I went one evenlng Into a dressing-room in the tv.il~ght to procure some 
article that \+as there; \+hen s ~ ~ d d e n l y  there fell upon me without any warning, just as if 
11 came out of the darkness, a horrtble fear of my own existence. Simultaneously there 
arose in my m ~ n d  the Image of an e p ~ l e p t ~ c  patlerit whom I had seen In the asylum, a 
black-ha~red youth with green~sh shin, entirely idlotlc, who used to sit all day on one of 
the benches, or rather shelves against the \\all, ~ i t h  ls knees drawn up aga~nst h ~ s  chin, 
and the coarse gray undershirt, whlch \$as his only garment, drawn over them inclos~ng 
his entlre figure He sat there l ~ k e  a sort of sculptured Egyptlan cat or Peruvlan 
mummy, movlng noth~ng but h ~ s  black eyes and look~ng absolutely non-human. T h ~ s  
irnage and my fear entered Into a specjes of comb~nat~orl  wrth each other. That shape 
atn I, 1 felt, potentially. Nothing that 1 possess can defend me against that fate, ~f the 
hour for ~t should s t r~ke  for me ac it struck for h ~ m . ~  
The key line in this text is James's warning, "that shape am I, I felt, 
potentially." James is hereby denying the existence of a fixed, inherited self 
as a given. The choice of  the word "shape'' is crucial here, for it attributes 
an  almost chameleon-like character to self-identity. The self that we accept 
ourselves to be is but one tenuous shaping, which is vulnerable to forces that 
can up-end it and cause us to  present ourselves to  the world in a multiple 
number of profoundly different ways. The task is obvious. We must seize 
the world on behalf of  our own version and it is this version that is to 
become our self. This is not to  be an act of intellect but rather an  act of wilt. 
On April 30, 1870, James records this decisive step. 
I think that yesterday Mas a crlsls rn my I~fe .  1 fln~shed the flrsf part of Renouvler's 
second "Essais" and see no reason why hls d e f i n ~ t ~ o n  f Free Wrll-"the sustatnlng of a 
thought becalcse I choose ro \\hen I m~ght  have other thoughtsv-need be the deflnltion 
of an illus~on. At any rate, 1 N I I I  assume for the present-until next year-that it is no 
illue~on. My flrst act of free w~l l  shall be to belleve In free \ \ i l l  . . 
Not In mawlms, not in Anschalrungen, but In accumulated acts of thought l ~ e s  
calvat~on. Passer outre. H~therto,  when I have felt 11he t a h g  a free lnitlat~ve, llke 
d a r ~ n g  to act originally, nithout carefully wa~ting for coritemplatron of the external 
tiorld to determ~ne all for me, sulclde seemed the most manly form to put my daring 
Into; now, I will go a step further with my will, not only act wlth it, but believe as \\ell; 
belleve in my rndrvidual real~ty and creatlve posrer My belief, to be sure, can't be 
opt~m~st~c-but  I will pos~t  life (the real, the good) In the self-govern~ng resrstanceof the 
ego to the world. Life shall [be built ~ n ]  doing and suffering and creating.' 
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The die is cast for James's future in both life and thought. Not seduced 
by any form o f  Pollyanna optimism,'O James affirms the creative character 
of the human organism in positing the meaning of the world as inseparable 
from how we "have" the world, that is, how we experience the world. We 
are not to the world as a spectator is to a picture but rather as a sculptor to 
matter. Many years later, in Pragmatisin, h e  is to affirm this position in an  
even more Promethean way. 
In our  cogni t~ve as  \\ell a s  111 ou r  actlve l ~ f e  we are  creative. We acid, both t o  the  
subject and t o  the p red~ca te  part o f  reality. The  world stands really malleable, 
\\-altlng to  receive Its f ~ n a l  touches a t  o u r  hands. Llhe the  kingdom of heaven, it 
suffers hunian v~olence \ \~ l l~ng ly .  Man erlger7dels truths upon ~ t . "  
If the crisis texts yield an impressionistic view of the fragility of rhe 
self, James's scientific dubiety of the fixed self is found in The Principles of 
Psychology. In the chapters in "The Stream of Thought" and "The 
Conscio~tsness of Self," he rejects the classical doctrine of the substantial 
soul, and the idealist transcendental ego. And although he expresses some 
admiration for Wume's treatment of personal identity," he condemns the 
ensuing Associationist philosophy as being unable to account for how the 
self "comes to be aware of itself."" Two years after publishing the Prin- 
ciples, James was forced to condense his tho~tghts  on the self for presen- 
t at ion it1 hi5 Psychology-Briefer Course. 
The contcloutness of Self involves a stream of thought,  each part of \\hlch a s  '1' car1 
remember those whrch \sent before, knon the t h ~ n g s  they knew, and care  paramountly 
for uertaln ones among them as  'Me, ' a n d  approprmte  l o  these the rest. T h ~ r  Me 1s an  
e m p ~ r ~ c a l  aggregate of t h ~ n g s  object~vely  kno\+n T h e  I w h ~ c h  hno\bs them cannot ~tse l f  
be an aggregate; neither for psycholog~cal purpose5 need ~t be an  unchangln% 
metaphvs~cal  enrlty l ~ h e  the Soul,  o r  a p r ~ n c ~ p l e  llhe the  transcendental Ego, wetted a s  
'out of t lme ' 11 15 a rl7ou,ql7c, at each moment d~f fe ren r  from that of the last moment. 
but approprra,r\te o f  the latter, together w ~ t h  all that t he  latter called ~ t s  own All the 
e \pe r~e r i t~a l  facts f~ r id  t l i e~ r  placr In t h ~ t  descr~pt ion,  unencumbered with any hypothesic 
save that of the evlsterice o f  pas s~ng  thoughts o r  states o f  m ~ n d . "  
The self that is appropriative in the stream of thought is the 
physiological correlate to the Promethean self of the crisis texts. Further, 
this self is anticipatory of the self that risks belief in hypotheses so as t o  
elicit data unavailable were an agnostic position adopted. Consequently, 
James's much maligned essay on "The Will t o  Believe" is simply an  
epistemological version of what he earlier affirmed in deeply personal terms 
and then accounted for in the context of physiological p ~ y c h o l o g y . ' ~  
The next step in James's development of his notion of  the self comes 
with his doctrine of radical empiricism. Its most clear formulation is found 
in his "Preface" to The Meaning of Truth, published in 1909. 
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Radical empiricism consists first of  a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally 
of a generalized conclusion. 
The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers 
shall be things def~nable in terms drawn from experience. [Things of  an unex- 
perienceable nature may exist ad I~bitum, but they form no part of the material for 
philosophic debate.] 
The statement of fact IS that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as 
disjunctive, are just as  much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor 
less so, than the things themselver. 
The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together 
from next to  next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly 
apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective sup- 
port, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or  continuous structure.'" 
Both the "statement of fact" and the "generalized conclusion" are 
significant for our present concerns, The "fact7' is that relations become 
experienced equivalent to the objects experienced. This yields a tissue of  
continuous transition, in which the human organism is never wholly other 
from the relations that intend or  lead from the world of objects. This 
continuity is affectively experienced, always, in such a way that it is never 
necessary or  warranted to posit a s  "a generalized conclusion" that there be 
an external principle of accountability, be it God, the Absolute Mind or 
some eternal law of Nature. The upshot of James's position is that the 
human self, as i t  were, is on its own for its ofin creation within the flow of 
experience. That is, the human self is on its own for the formulation o f  its 
peculiar "shape" as wrested from the "push and pressure of the c ~ s m o s . " ' ~  
Actually, forging the self is a scramble, characterized by the interplay of 
environ and presence, with novelty and mishap lurking everywhere. So 
strongly does James believe this version, that in a footnote to  his essay on 
"The Experience of Activity," he  portrays the vaunted "I" as but a 
pronoun of position, struggling to maintain its presence in an  ever shifting 
relational flow. 
The indiv~dual~zed self, which 1 belleve to be the only thlng properly called self, is a 
part of the content of the world euperienced. The world euperienced (otherwise 
called the 'f~eld of consciousness') comes at all times with our body as its centre, 
centre of vision, centre of  action, centre of rnterest. Where the body Ir is 'here'; 
\$hen the body acts is 'now'; what the body touches 1s 'this'; all other things are 
'there' and 'then' and 'tliat'. These words of emphasized position rmply a 
systematizat~on of things ~ i t h  reference to a focus of actlon and interest which lie5 
in the body; arid the systematlzatloti is no\\ so instinctive (wa$ ~t ever not FO?) that 
no developed or active experrence exists for us at all except in that ordered form. So  
far as 'thoughts' and 'feel~ngs' can be active, their activity terminates in the activlty 
o f  the body, and only through f~rs t  arouslng 11s activit~es can they begin to change 
those of  the rest o f  the world. The body IS the Ftorm centre, the origln of co- 
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ordinates, the constant place of stress In all that experience-train. Everything circles 
round it, and is felt from its polnt of view. The word ' I ' ,  then, 1s pr~marlly a noun 
o f  positron, just like 'that' and 'here'. Actlvitles attached to 'this' position have 
prerogatrve emphasis, and,  if activities have feelings, must be felt In a peculiar nay .  
The word 'my' des~gnates the kind of emphasis I Fee no inconsistency whatever In 
defending, on the one hand, 'my' act~vities as unique and opposed to those of outer 
nature, and on  the other hand in affirming, after Introspection, that they consist in 
movements In the head. The 'my' of them 1s the emphasis, the feeling of perspective- 
Interest in which they are dyed.18 
A careful reading of this text shows that James's Promethean self is 
still tinged with the fragility that emanates from the "crisis" texts. If the 
"my" of myself is dependent on how I "feel" the messages of my en- 
vironment, then we are perilously close to a derivative self. Yet James insists 
that in our conscious life we are active; welcoming, selecting, and choosing 
ali the while. After all, "each of us dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different 
p l a ~ e . ' ' ' ~  
For casual readers of James, the term "kosmos" may seem rather 
prepossessing. Indeed, it is nothing less than the cosmos that is the im- 
mediate environ. Nonetheless, such an environ must be experienced in 
distinctively persona1 terms. For James, "so long a s  we deal with the cosmic 
and the general, we deal only with the symbols of reality, but assoon as we 
deal with the private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities 
in The completest sense of the terrn."20 
We must admit that James seems t o  miss a crucial context at this point. 
On the one hand, consciousness has access t o  nothing less than the wider 
range of  consciousness "from which saving experiences flow in."" On the 
other hand, our  "inner state is our very experience itself; its reality and that 
of our experience are one."'2 Yet, as we of the twentieth century know all 
too  well, it is the filtering of these cosmic and personal experiences through 
the social matrix that is how we have our being. T o  the contrary, James is 
quite intractable on this matter, for even when he describes the social 
context of our experience, he asserts the irreducibility of the distinctively 
personal. He  writes: 
A conscious field pltrs its object as feIt or  thought of pllrs an attitude towardr the object 
plus the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs-such a concrete btt of personal 
experlence may be a small bit, but i t  is a solid bit as long as it lasts; not hollow, not a 
mere abstract element of experlence, such as the 'object' IS when taken all alone." 
All is not lost, however. What would happen if we were to  describe 
James's radically empirical self in distinctively social terms? Let us contend 
that the relational environ is so irreducibly social that James's descriptive 
tension between the Promethean self and a wider range of  consciousness is 
mediated by social transactions. In direct terms, James is not much help on 
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this matter. In the almost fourteen hundred pages of text in his Principlesof 
Psychology, he devotes little more than two pages to the "social self." His 
version of the social self sounds quaint to our contemporary awareness. H e  
writes that "a tnan S Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his 
mates. . . . Properly speaking, a tnan has as many social selves as there are 
individlrals who recognize him and carry an itnage of him in their mind. "'" 
Although this statement is the line of  prose and thought that provided the 
impetus for G. H.  Mead to develop his own important doctrine of the self as 
social, it is not the direction I wish to take. 
My contention is that if we take James's radical empiricism as our 
point of departure, we can develop a notion of the social self that can be of 
fundamental assistance to contemporary social thought." The self in 
James's thought is both aggressive and fragile. Its home-made character 
poses a challenge to forge a series of mooring points in an ever-changing 
flow of experience. These moorings are vantage points rather than pylons, 
The self casts about for the optimum relational choices, seeking to advance 
the interest-oriented concerns of the organism. To  fail to make relations 
yields three pejorative results. The self is either cut adrift as flotsam in the 
flow, or is mired while the  flow rushes by, impervious to our needs, or  still 
again, more dangerously, is cast out of the flow and remains as jetsam. 
When the self is self-creative, i t  moves hand over hand through the 
relational fabric, pointing, intending, leading and constructing all the while. 
For the self to be without novel relations is for it t o  be subject to enervation 
and severe shrinkage, somewhat like the proverbial "raisin in the sun." 
Relation amputation and relation starvation threaten the capacity of the self 
to energize and reshape in response to the novel press of experience. In 
reverse, relation saturation and relation seduction are characterized by an  
accosting of the self with more than it can handle, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively." The making of  relations is not done out of whole cloth, for 
each I-elation has its own set of demands and prices. In effect, the self 
proceeds from its own transient locale, physically and psychologically, and, 
as such, confronts relational possibilities and implications intended to  be 
consonant with its own interests. These relations, however, often have other 
fish to fry. They teem with hidden novelty and obligations to still other 
relations not directly in the purview of the self. 
James is quite aware of these novelties, for he  writes: "Our fields of 
experience have n o  more definite boundaries than have our fields of 
view. Both are fringed forever by a tnore that continuously develops and 
continuously supersedes them as life proceeds."" The "more" of which 
James speaks is not a mere accretion. Rather it begets still further 
novelty. In a kaIeidoscopic fashion, each turn of  the wheel, each new 
relation begets not only "more" relationships but retroactively changes 
the relationships previously undergone. For James, "there can be no 
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difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference el~ewhere."~" 
Whereas the common assumption is that we stand relatively fixed, 
somewhat as an observer, while things and situations change "around" 
us, James's perception of our situation is radically different. The self, as 
present to the world, is more of a permeable membrane than a spectating 
redoubt. Relational changes do not happen "around" us as mere ex- 
ternal ports of call. Rather, they penetrate the very fabric of our being 
and, optimally at least, demand that we reshape, reassess, reconnoitre, 
rework, and revisit each of our previous relations undergone. For the 
most part, we do not act this way, lapsing rather into an Archimedean 
point of view as a spectator of a picture. In this Iatter way, relations are 
only external to us, shorn of their febrility and capacity to transform. 
We move through the world as a ghoul, looking but not seeing. We are 
dead, not only to the press of experience, but to ourselves as well. 
Now to the point at issue, the Jamesian self and its relationship to 
the experience of community. Just as the self is a bundle of relations, so 
more so is the community. Communal relations differ from the ongoing 
fabric of relations, ueberhaupt, in that they are self-conscious and often 
intentionally reflective. James failed to focus on the fact that my own 
self consciousness comes into being inseparable from how I am con- 
sciously "had" by others. He was unaware of Marx's notion of the 
Gattungswesen, or species-consciousness, which is the single most potent 
influence on how I come to understand who I am. James was correct in 
stressing the creative, interested, and assertive character of the human 
organism. He neglected, however, the formative power of the social 
situation, which, despite our Promethean protestations, conditions all of 
our versions of what we are doing, including and especially those we 
contend to be distinctively independent of such influence. In a word, 
James was not aware of the blanketing presence of self-deception, a 
notion so central to twentieth-century thought as a bequest from Marx, 
Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and Sartre. 
Still, James is not without significant contributions on this matter. 
Twentieth-century social thought, when sophisticated, is largely an attack 
on the naive tradition of a substantial self, operating independently o f  its 
social environment. James never held such a position. Somewhat 
ironically, then, it turns out that although James does not take into 
sufficient consideration the significance of the social context, his em- 
pirical description of the human self is strikingly akin to that o f  twen- 
tieth-century thought. Specifically, James's self is functionally rather 
than onroIogically derived. Although his point of departure is 
physiology, James duplicates the position of existential thought, namely, 
that the human self has no fixed place from which to proceed. In fact, i t  
is precisely this lack of an inherited place that distinguishes James's 
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notion of the self from classical philosophical and psychological 
positions, and which therefore makes James's thought so relevant to  
contemporary social thought. Indeed, the onIy notion of the self that is 
viable in our century is one that is functional rather than ontological in 
its principle of accountability. And that is precisely the position of 
James. Let us look at  the potential significance of James's thought on  
this issue, as directed to the important contemporary problem of "having 
a place." 
In my judgment, the crucial difference between Aristotelianism and 
Copernicanism traces to the doctrine of place. In the Aristotelian per- 
spective, everything had a natural place, and the human organism was 
not an exception. Copernicanism dealt a devastating blow to this living- 
room version of the cosmos, by casting deep doubt on the fixed 
character of the planets. For Aristotle, the importance of human life was 
inextricably tied to the importance of the planet earth as nothing less 
than the physical center of the cosmos. The eradicarion of that centrality 
by Copernicanism signaled a deep disquiet about the ontological status of 
human life, The intervening centuries between Copernicanism and the 
twentieth century witnessed an  effort at temporary repair by Newtonian 
physics, But the die was cast and the full implications of Copernicanism 
finally arrived in our century, sustained by quantum mechanics, a new 
cosmology, and the socially derived collapse of religious, political, and 
ideological eschatologies. In a word, the deepest contemporary on- 
tological problem is that of Unheimlichkeit or  homelessness. The vast, 
limitless, perhaps infinite universe does not award us a place. The planet 
earth is a node in the midst of cosmic unintelligibility. According to 
Aristotle, who we are is where we are. And where anything is, is a 
function of where everything is, so that there exists a center and a 
periphery. If that is so, we are now no one,  for we are  nowhere, in that 
we d o  not know the extension of the cosmos, or for that matter, whether 
i t  has any periphery at  all. Pascal anticipated our situation when he 
wrote: "The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me."?' 
James, to the contrary, was not put off by the colIapse of the 
Aristotelian world-view. H e  never as4umed that we had a place, for,  as 
such, there is n o  place as proper place. If James is correct, as I think he 
i4, then we have no place, for, in fact, there is no  place. A place, like 
time in the famous adage, must be seized. T o  seize a place is not only to 
affirm that this is my place. It  is also to deny a host of relations, such 
as, for example, this is your place, some other place, or  no  place at all. 
It is true that to be is to be in place, that is, in some place rather than 
another place. What is less obvious, however, is that every place seized is 
a place denied. Every reIation accepted is a relation denied, or  held up, 
or held o f f ,  and, therefore, the place we have is by no means the one we 
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must have, although we come to  think of it that way. Epistemologically, 
our strongest tendency by far is t o  assume that the way things are is the 
way they should be, or even must be. In James's philosophy, this is not 
so, for the way things are is most often a path of least resistance, a result 
of having said a precipitous "no" to  countless alternatives. Saying "yes" 
to a relational possibility often has the unfortunate consequence of 
having to  deny that we have said "no" to a series of competing 
relational possibilities. Having denied that we have said "no," it is too 
infrequent that we reopen the conversation, tending rather to accept our 
situation as inevitable and fixed, We receive little help here from our  
peers, since they for the most part function similarly. Further, all of us 
seem to  treat each other as though our own fixations, mutatis inutandis, 
belong t o  them as well. 
The social science of community, or even of general human 
gatherings, has not been of much help here. Categories abound: mother, 
father; black, white; parent, child; male, female; rural, urban; blue and 
white collar; each cleaves its own peculiar separation, oblivious that such 
distinctions criss-cross and render dubious any subsequent generalization. 
In a word, we have come to accept sameness rather than relational 
novelty as the order of the day. 
On behalf of this contention, let us ask the following questions: 
What is i t  to say that someone lives there or  here or  son~ewhere? What is 
it t o  say that someone went there or  someplace? Again, what d o  we 
mean when we say that someone is from there or  here or  someplace? In 
general, there is a tendency to think that we know what we mean by such 
identifications, such placeholders. T o  the contrary, in empirical terms, I 
think that we assert what we d o  not, in fact, know, but only assume as a 
fallout of the generic meaning of the pIaceholder. In effect, we affirm a 
name, a location, an identity as a way o f  salvaging and negating most of 
the relationships that any event, place, or  person necessarily entails. 
Thereby, we trade off sterile, nominating concepts as a substitute for the 
richness of actual situations. In Jamesian terms, these nominations are 
but placeholders, barely representative of the relational fuIlness with 
which life concretely comes. For James, as we have mentioned, even the 
I, the me, is but a stand-in for the rush of competing selves that both 
occupy and relent in our stream of consciousness. Things, and all the 
more so, selves, are not singles. Rather, they are  knots of competing 
relations, fluid and not definable as separate from how they are ex- 
perienced in the consciousness of others. Yet with rare, albeit important 
 exception^,'^ the social sciences still assume that things exist as such, that 
objects exist as such, and that names are  descriptive of events, places, 
and artifacts, rather than as substitutes for processes. And, of course, 
the converse is also held, namely, that unless named, our  experiences d o  
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not exist." The relationship between such an  attitude and the ascendancy 
of quantitative method in the social sciences should not be overlooked. 
James's approach is decidedly different. In his thought, there are no 
singles outside the network, the web, or  the concatenated context, which 
is never known as an  AN-einheit. Rather, to know the world is to know it 
as durcheinander, through and through, in which everything, every place, 
every event is freighted with a "more," a coming and a going, a saving 
and a losing. And we speak here on the level of  the obvious, saying 
nothing at this time of the subterranean recesses of our conscious life, or  
our dreams, tics, and functionally repressed secrets. 
Returning to our concern with the doctrine o f  place, let us deepen 
our  analysis somewhat. Where are you? You answer, I am here. Yet here 
to you is there to me. What is it for you to  be there, that is, to be in 
place, in that place? Your response, however prosaically jejune it may 
be, nonetheless has got to be relation-saturated. Supposing our site is a 
town, a village, a neighborhood, a farm, a block, that is, some version 
of a Lebenswelt. I now ask myself, did I start here? Or  did I come here? 
Do I want to be here or  am I backing and filling? Am I here on behalf 
of my leaving? Or,  would my leaving betray my wanting to stay? And 
what of memories? Are they selective? If so, are they on behalf of my 
leaving or my staying? Perhaps I am that kind of person for whom 
memories are called upon not to justify what I want to d o  bur rather to  
justify what I do. 
Now it turns out that I leave from here in order to live there. From 
the side of leaving, why did I go? Was it a response to a need and if so, 
of what kind? Was it a response to a fantasy o r  to  a Walter Mitty 
fulfillment? Again, could it not have been an escape? Perhaps it was 
only a drifting as in going from one place to another, in a form of 
personal flotsam. So too,  from the side o f  arriving there from here, 
similar ambiguities crop up. Am I here because I wanted to  come or 
because I have been forced to come, called by the lure and pull of  
others? Am I here on the way to somewhere else or as an exile, soon to 
return whence I came? Perhaps I am very unusual for an American, and 
I am here to  stay. At least, so I think-now. 
I can be still more specific. Let us take the case of  a young child 
who is moved from one neighborhood, home, room, to  another. This 
move is a "step up," as they say. The neighborhood is better, the home 
is nicer, and the  room is bigger. Yet a deep loneliness sets in and our 
child cries itself t o  sleep each evening. Some would say that the obvious 
reason is a loss of friends, but I believe that to be too one-dimensional 
for a sufficient cause. Rather, the relations severed are more subtle. The 
Jamesian "penumbra," the "halo of relations," has been abandoned. 
Lost is the familiar creak of  a stair, a shadow cast by the bough of a 
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tree, and the play of light in the child's room, dusk to dawn. Each of 
them, among countless other sounds and shapes, has acted as a mooring 
for the ever floating consciousness. Psychically, we are originally 
weightless and i t  is necesary for us to hook ourselves to a series of 
things, artifacts, and images, which in turn tell us where we are and even 
who we are. 
The social psychologists and the social anthropologists are correct. 
We are creatures formed in the cauldron of the other, selves, things, 
shadows of all shapes, rings of tones, scent of smells, and above all the 
double-barrelled touch of touch. James failed to stress sufficiently this 
context of other. Nonetheless, they fail to stress what James knew all too 
well, that the active self is hydra-headed and brimming with sensorial 
capacities, each of them capable of rendering distinctively personal even 
fhe most obvious of commonness. 
Marx, Durkheim, Mead, Dewey, have i t  right. The self is a social 
construct. But James has it right as well. It is the personalIy idiosyncratic 
seeker of relations who puts a distinctive cast on the world. Marx tells us 
that institutions condition consciousnes~, but who more than Marx 
himself intruded his personal version of the world on these very same 
institutions. The social and the communal are intrusive, but so too is the 
personal. Nothing is final. To this, James attests over and over. 
Everything you can t h ~ n k  of ,  however vast or ~nclus~ve,  has on the pluralist~c view a 
genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one 
another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over 
everything. The word 'and' trails along after every sentence. Somethirig always 
escapes. 'Ever not quite' has to be said of the best attempts made anywhere in the 
universe at attaining all-incl~siveness.'~ 
Above all, the escape is perpetrated by the individual, especially the 
Promethean self. In the last analysis, the critical question is how do we feel 
and how we do feel about? In the contemporary stress on social con- 
ditioning let us not forget James's warning: 
Ind~viduality is founded In feel~ng; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blindel strata 
of character, are the only placer In the world ~n which we catch real fact In the making, 
and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done." 
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